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Abstract We examine three critical aspects of Popper’s formulation of the
‘Logic of Scientiﬁc Discovery’—evidence, content and degree of corroboration—
and place these concepts in the context of the Tree of Life (ToL) problem with
particular reference to molecular systematics. Content, in the sense discussed by
Popper, refers to the breadth and scope of existence that a hypothesis purports to
explain. Content, in conjunction with the amount of available and relevant evi-
dence, determines the testability, or potential degree of corroboration, of a
statement; content distinguishes scientiﬁc hypotheses from metaphysical asser-
tions. Degree of corroboration refers to the relative and tentative conﬁdence
assigned to one hypothesis over another, based upon the performance of each
under critical tests. Here we suggest that systematists attempt to maximize content
and evidence to increase the potential degree of corroboration in all phylogenetic
endeavors. Discussion of this ‘‘total evidence’’ approach leads to several inter-
esting conclusions about generating ToL hypotheses.
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Because of genome sequencing initiatives, the breadth of organisms sampled and
the completeness with which they are described offers evolutionary biologists new
opportunity for great advances in understanding life on Earth. For the ﬁrst time,
systematists are beginning to make and test potentially credible ToL hypotheses.
The biggest challenge to achieving the goal of a well corroborated theory of the
evolutionary history of all of life on our planet (which is by and large prokaryotic) is
eliminating the potentially confounding effects homoplasy, due in large part to
horizontal gene transfer (HGT), may have on recovering vertical, or organismal,
history in phylogenetic analysis. A telling example of the importance of the
philosophical ramiﬁcations of this endeavor concerns deciding whether or not a
bifurcating tree of life (ToL) exists for all life on Earth. Some scientists feel that the
problem of eliminating the effects of homoplasy is insurmountable because one can
never know if one ﬁnds the ‘‘true’’ or ‘‘real’’ tree or instead recovers a tree-shaped
network of connections that more closely reﬂects horizontal signal than the actual
history of life (Bapteste et al. 2008; Doolittle and Bapteste 2007). In other words,
these authors claim that a bifurcating tree of life is impossible to attain, at least for
the bacterial and archaeal branches. They also suggest that the current state of
microbial evolutionary study rejects the very hypothesis that there is a bifurcating
tree of life for prokaryotic organisms.
We disagree with both of these conclusions.
First, we suggest that the ‘‘ToL analysis is impossible’’ conclusion is problematic
because it is a speciﬁc expression of a general question that applies to all of science,
that being, ‘‘Do our hypotheses faithfully describe reality?’’. The answer is, of
course, unknowable. The correspondence of human knowledge to a universal reality
is ultimately uncertain and, as pointed out by Popper, there are two distinct ways of
approaching the problem. One approach is to take a conventionalist position, which
is to say that, because science is inseparable from (presumably fallacious) human
thought, there is no reasonable expectation of any correspondence of scientiﬁc
theory to reality because we cannot control for the potential confounding affects of
our perceptions. The other position is that, through application of critical tests to our
hypotheses and by continuously changing those hypotheses in response to
falsiﬁcation (as in Popper’s The Logic of Scientiﬁc Discovery), we come closer to
describing reality by determining what is universally true through consistency with
critical test. There is no objective way to choose between these two positions, but as
scientists, it is logical to think that we approach some approximation of how things
actually are.
With this in mind, we suggest, contra Doolittle and Bapteste (2007), that there is
ample background evidence to support the existence of a distinct bifurcating history
of life on Earth, even for prokaryotes, because the majority of genetic material is
passed from one cell to another vertically (e.g., Beiko and Hamilton 2006; Beiko
and Ragan 2008). We suggest, in turn, that any claim that the ToL hypothesis has
been refuted must offer a hypothesis that is at least equally or better corroborated. In
the absence of such an alternate, critically tested hypothesis that explains the graded
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‘‘tree of naturally selected forms’’.
1
Our question is: ‘‘How do we best interpret genomic character data in a way that
informs us of the evolutionary history of both the organisms that make up life (the
ToL) and the potentially horizontally transferred genes that make up the genomes of
those organisms?’’
2 Reinterpreting the LSD for the Genomic ToL
Faith (2006) criticizes Helfenbein and DeSalle (2005) for writing: ‘‘It might be
timely to reverse roles and allow science to play the part of the horse pulling the cart
of philosophy to ﬁnish the journey begun decades ago by the dedicated workers
interested in making logical sense of their science’’ (p. 279). We agree with this
criticism; the philosophy of science, of course, logically precedes the gathering and
testing of data. A better analogy to how we should approach the ToL problem,
perhaps, is that we should ﬁt our scientiﬁc cart with a new hitch to the horse of
philosophy. In other words, Popperian philosophy should be revisited in order that it
is better applied to the novel systematic problems produced by genomic technology
with special reference to the Tree of Life problem.
Faith and Trueman (2001), Faith (2004), Helfenbein and DeSalle (2005), Faith
(2006) and Lienau (2007) attempted to make inroads into this challenge. The goal
of the current paper is to re-examine the relationship of content, corroboration and
evidence to systematic science in light of the existence of massive amounts of
genomic data for large numbers of taxa. We conclude that evidence (e) in ToL
systematics is the observation of similarity among organisms that can be
formulated in to potentially falsifying hypotheses of relationship (homology
characters, or the ideographic transformation series of Grant and Kluge (2004) and
synapomorphies) to test hypotheses of relationship (h). We point out that these
observations are dynamic, and that data can be arranged in myriad different ways,
each arrangement corresponding to an observational vantage point that tests the
content of hypotheses of relationship independently in a total evidence, super-
matrix framework.
1 We disagree with the Doolittle and Bapteste (2007) assertion that the Darwin’s tree is the explanandum,
or what needs to be explained; it is a hypothesis, or explanans, of why organisms look similar by degrees.
To wit, Darwin writes ‘‘In considering the origin of species, it is quite conceivable that a naturalist
reﬂecting on the mutual afﬁnities of organic beings…might come to the conclusion that each species had
not been independently created, but had descended, like varieties, from other species. Nevertheless, such
a conclusion would be unsatisfactory, until it could be shown how the innumerable species of this world
have been modiﬁed…’’ (Darwin 2004). This passage shows that Darwin (the naturalist) had come to the
conclusion that the afﬁnities, or similarities, of organisms are best explained by hypothesizing that they
are the result of descent from common species (a tree). That he added natural selection to the tree of
descent hypothesis and that one can also use a tree to depict the overall similarity of organisms without a
hypothesis of evolutionary history (i.e., phenetics) is beside the point.
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‘‘I believe that these two ideas – content and degree of corroboration – are the
most important logical tools in my book.’’ (Popper 2002, p. 411)
Content is a quality of a particular theory or hypothesis. Popper described content
as follows: ‘‘…the content of a theory, which is the same as its improbability,
determines its testability and its corroborability’’ (Popper 2002, p. 411). A higher
level of content, then, corresponds to a higher level of testability or greater relative
difference in statement from background knowledge (b). Popper was very clear
about the relationship of content to testability when he stated that, ‘‘To a higher
degree of universality or precision corresponds a greater (logical or) empirical
content, and thus a higher degree of testability’’ (Popper 2002, p. 106).
Precision is the narrowness of space in the universe of possible statements that
statements consistent with a hypothesis occupy. Precision is the level of description
that is reached by the predictions of the hypothesis. Higher levels of precision
correspond to ﬁner and ﬁner descriptions of reality; this increases testability by
limiting the number possible events that are consistent with the theory. Precision is
exclusion. (Lienau 2007)
Universality is the number of classes that are derivable from a hypothetical
statement (i.e., must be true if the hypothesis is true). This can be perceived as the
phenomena that are provided for by, and thus can be used to test, the hypothesis;
universality is the scope and range of demands the hypothesis makes on reality
which in turn can vary in levels of speciﬁcity or precision. Universality is inclusion.
(Lienau 2007)
4 Degree of Corroboration (DOC)
Popper proposed the concept of degree of corroboration (herein referred as DOC,
when convenient) as relative tentative conﬁrmation or conﬁdence in one hypothesis
over another based upon the performance of each hypothesis under critical tests.
Degree of corroboration is not equivalent to statistical or formal probability, but is
based on a distinct ‘‘absolute’’ probability calculus Popper wrote to eliminate
contradictions and logical absurdities that arise when one attempts to use a formal
probability calculus (logical or statistical) to assess the support of a hypothesis (or
any relatively universal statement) by evidence (Appendix ix in Popper 2002).
The idea of corroboration is central to empirical science. ‘‘Corroborate’’, unlike
‘‘conﬁrm’’ carries with it the acknowledgement that science involves testable
conjectures that must be able to be falsiﬁed by experience and further, that this
knowledge is tentative and meant to be replaced by new thoughts, or hypotheses that
can be more easily tested and may stand up better to test. Thus, scientiﬁc knowledge
can never be veriﬁed, only tentatively accepted. Popper saw the corroboration of a
theory (or hypothesis, h) by evidence (e) as a continuum that ranged in degrees from
refutation to independence, or irrelevance, to corroboration.
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of corroboration to be ‘‘the degree to which a hypothesis stands up to severe tests,
the appraisal of the worth of the hypothesis’’. ‘Truth’ and ‘conﬁrmation’ have no
role in the absolute calculus of corroboration. Truth, according to Popper (2002), is
atemporal (Helfenbein and DeSalle 2005), because ‘‘what is true in the present was
true in the past and will be true in the future’’ (Popper 2002). Corroboration is
temporal because the outcome of tests is unknown before they are implemented: a
particular test may have corroborated a hypothesis yesterday, and another more
severe test corroborated it today; most importantly, though, is that another, more
severe test may refute the hypothesis tomorrow. Popper rejected the word
‘‘conﬁrmation’’ precisely because conﬁrmation indicates static truth, which,
according to him, does not exist in the realm of science. From the history of
science, an intuitively satisfying example of this situation is the rejection during the
twentieth century of Newton’s hypotheses of gravity in favor of Einstein’s
propositions, framed within his relativity theory.
Popper developed several equations for this calculus based on the desiderata of
his new ‘absolute’ probability system. The most novel aspect of the calculus was the
ability to deﬁne zero probability for a hypothesis (h) (which occurs in the
denominator). Popper’s formula for DOC
2 is shown below:
Ce ; h ðÞ ¼
Pe ; h ðÞ   Pe ðÞ
Pe ; h ðÞ   Pe h ðÞ þ Pe ðÞ
This equation can be read as ‘‘the corroboration of evidence (e) given hypothesis
(h) is equal to the absolute probability of e given h minus the absolute probability of
e alone divided by the absolute probability of e given h minus the absolute
probability of h uniﬁed with e (where the two probabilities intersect) plus the
absolute probability of e alone.
Popper then adds the variable b, to account for evidence present, but outside of
the test in question (background knowledge):
Ce ; h; b ðÞ ¼
Pe ; hb ðÞ   Pe ; b ðÞ
Pe ; hb ðÞ   Pe h ; b ðÞ þ Pe ; b ðÞ
This complex equation has several components to it. For instance, p(e, hb) can be
read ‘‘the probability of the evidence given the hypothesis and the background
knowledge’’. The numerator of the equation is then this term minus the ‘‘probability
of the evidence given the background knowledge alone’’, giving a measure of the
explanatory advantage of the hypothesis for the evidence at hand. The denominator
in the equation, while complex looking and having little intuitive signiﬁcance, is
deemed to be ‘‘the simplest normalization factor’’ (Popper 1983, p. 240).
2 The terms in the following equations require some basic deﬁnitions: evidence (e) comes in the form of
basic statements, which are the statements we agree upon as observation of occurrences. These statements
are, as all statements must be, conjectures based upon perception. Hypotheses (h) are falsiﬁable
conjectures made in the form of universal statements, which range from natural laws to the lower level
potentially falsifying hypotheses that we use to test the predictions of more universal hypotheses.
Background knowledge (b) is the set of assumptions on which our analyses are based; we take these
statements as the given truth (and so must take care in deciding just what they should be).
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evidence(e)andbackgroundknowledge(b).Corroborationcanonlybeaccomplished
ifhisfalsiﬁable(i.e.,itmustcontaintestablecontentthatisdifferentfromb)andgives
predictionsconsistentwithe(i.e.,demandsfewadhochypothesestoﬁttheevidence).
A test must ‘‘prove its mettle’’ (Popper 2002) by maximizing the value in the
numerator, ‘‘p(e, hb)-p(e, b)’’ with respect to competing hypotheses. The numerator
will be positive as the probability of e becomes greater due to h relative to b (this is
corroboration). Negative values for the numerator are obtained if the probability of e
in the light of h is less that that given b alone (this is falsiﬁcation). No corroboration
results if both probabilities are the same and the value of the numerator is zero; the
result is a tautology. When a statement is corroborated, C (h, e, b) can be any value
from just larger than 0 to 1.0. Where, then, does corroboration become signiﬁcant?
Popper suggested the arbitrary value of  as a good lower value of signiﬁcance in the
following quote:‘‘the support given by e-hbecomes signiﬁcantonlywhenp(e,hb)-
p(e, b)[1/2’’ (Popper 1983, p. 240).
A multitude of papers have been written about the applicability of particular
optimality criteria, in light of Popper’s logic (Carpenter et al. 1998; Farris 1983,
1995, 1999, 2000; Felsenstein 1978, 1979, 1981, 1985; Kluge 2001; Siddall 2001)
and indeed Popper’s logic itself, (de Queiroz and Poe 2003; Rieppel 2003, 2005)
to phylogenetic systematics. We, of course, do have our own ideas about these
topics, but will not address them here. Instead, we will enter into the discussion
that Faith and Trueman (2001) and Faith (2004) started, regarding the issue of
corroboration in modern molecular systematics with regard to the ToL and the
‘species problem’. They conclude, ‘‘for building the ToL, we must combine
various pieces of evidence from separate studies in a meaningful way to evaluate
ToL hypotheses’’ (Faith 2004, p. 1). This statement is hard to argue with, but the
critical wording in this quote is ‘meaningful way’. What is the most meaningful
way to combine the evidence, in order to increase the universality (i.e., the
breadth and number of taxa included in the analysis) and precision of inferences
in the ToL problem?
There are currently two ways to accomplish this task, both with their own
arguments as to what ‘meaningful’ means and both with major ramiﬁcations as to
how the ToL is constructed. The ﬁrst approach utilizes the topological information
from various data sources separately. Trees that are generated from different
studies are evaluated in a ‘meaningful way’ and combined into a supertree.
Perhaps the least ‘meaningful’ way to produce a supertree is through consensus of
all of the trees involved: doing this does not consider DOC for each of the
individual trees, and completely disregards the potential for the existence of
composite signal or history that is more than simply the sum of the histories in
each separate analysis (hidden support; Gatesy et al. 1999). Perhaps a more
meaningful way to produce a supertree (in as much as this is possible at all) is by
matrix representation, using parsimony (MRP; Bininda-Emonds and Sanderson
2001) because the result of such an analysis is an approximation of a ‘total
evidence’ approach. However, the fundamental problem with supertree approaches
is that ‘‘it is impossible to translate accurately the relative character support from
different source trees into a supertree data set’’ (Gatesy et al. 2002). In other
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hypotheses generated from supertree approaches, because there is no way to
ascertain what the relationships of the taxa included in one phylogeny are to taxa
in another phylogeny without actually taking the trouble to analyze those
relationships under a common optimality criterion. To counter this suggestion,
Faith (2004) and Faith and Trueman (2001) developed a ‘combined corroboration
approach’ that utilizes the corroboration equations of Popper discussed above in
conjunction with Bayesian and X
2 statistics. We point out that application, like
this, of Popper’s corroboration formulae to non-absolute statistical systems are
problematic because of the inability of non-absolute statistical systems to
incorporate zero in the denominator.
The total evidence approach (Kluge 1989), suggests all available character
information needs to be incorporated into a combined matrix. This method can also
be called the ‘supermatrix approach’ Its advantage is that as long as independence
of characters is justiﬁed, the hypotheses generated by a supermatrix will be
meaningfully evaluated, that is to say tested as critically as possible given the data at
hand. Faith (2004, p. 12) has stated that attempts to construct a ‘‘supermatrix may
capture character support in some form, but may not allow for integration of
separate forms of corroboration assessment, related to different kinds of data, from
the separate studies’’.
We disagree with this statement on several grounds.
First, researchers can ascertain the contribution of different partitions to
support in a total-evidence framework (Gatesy et al. 1999). Second, Faith’s
position is tantamount to suggesting that different sources of characters should
be weighted differentially, a statement with broad philosophical implications
(e.g., Kluge 1997) and that cannot not be defended as empirical. Third, and most
importantly, the supermatrix or Matrix of Life (MoL) can accommodate any type
of data from any source and any time, provided computer power and researcher
will are strong enough. The combination of all of the available evidence in
totality to levy tests upon competing hypothesis is, indeed, the goal of the total
evidence approach.
Further, we suggest that once the information is combined into a single
supermatrix, one steps outside the realm of corroboration of partitions of data, to
enter into the realm of overall corroboration, making assessment of partition
corroboration relevant only to questions speciﬁc to the partition tested or to inquiries
into the relationship of corroboration among partitions. Overall character corrobo-
rationistheonly‘meaningful’waytoassesstheToL;asweelaboratebelow,wethink
that combined corroboration from various vantage points can be applied to produce a
meaningful way ofevaluatinghypotheses.We do, however,agreewithFaith’s (2004,
p. 1) assertion that it is important to resist ‘‘a priori justiﬁcation of one form of
evidence and focus ‘skeptically’ on many different kinds of evidence’’. Again, the
wording of the statement is critical; what does ‘‘many different kinds of evidence’’
mean in the context of corroboration? We therefore discuss next the role of
‘evidentiary vantage points in analysis space’ as a means to assess what is meant by
‘‘many different kinds of evidence’’.
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Systematists have had different ideas about what the evidence (e) is in systematic
analysis.Manyhaveidentiﬁedthesynapomorphyastheevidencethattestshypotheses
ofrelationship(e.g.,Kluge2003);othershave writtenthatthe ﬁtofthedata tothetree
(Faith 1992) or the character distribution (Novacek 2001) is evidence (e). More
recently, Grant and Kluge (2004) have argued that evidence (e) is the ideographic
character (the hypothesis of transformation of one biological attribute to another).
However, we see systematic evidence (e) as agreed upon conjectures of the
perceived similarity of biological traits that are tentatively accepted as fact for the
duration of an analysis. Because synapomorphies are hypotheses of homology that
are tested within the context of the analysis through the process of reciprocal
illumination (Hennig 1966), and indeed change throughout the examination of
different tree topologies during the search, they are not accepted as the tentative
ground on which our analyses stand. Rather, observations of similarity (be it of
nucleotide sequence or something we can point at, like spines) are the evidence (e)
that corroborate potentially falsifying hypotheses (which can be both the
ideographic characters of Grant and Kluge (2004) and synapomorphies). The ﬁt
of these characters to the particular hypothesis of relationship at hand is not
evidence for that hypothesis, as (Faith 1992) would argue, but is instead the extent
to which the evidence at hand corroborates the hypothesis, a concept that is
logically distinct from evidence (e). Rather, evidence (e) is observation formulated
into basic statements that are meant to test, and therefore may or may not be
consistent with, particular hypotheses.
Popper wrote, ‘‘[B]asic statements have the form of singular existential
statements… [they] must therefore satisfy the following conditions: (1) From a
universal statement, without initial conditions, no basic statements can be deduced.
On the other hand, (2) a universal statement and a basic statement may contradict
each other.’’ (Popper 2002, p. 82) and ‘‘Nor do we need say of basic statements that
they are ‘true’ or ‘false’ for we may interpret their acceptance as a conventional
decision, and the accepted states as a result of this decision.’’ (Popper 2002, p. 274).
Popper used the word ‘‘occurrence’’ to describe a basic statement in ‘‘realistic
language’’; basic statements are what we agree upon as the stopping point for what
we accept as evidence. They are the bricks of the building of science both in the
ediﬁcation of the falsiﬁable theories we endlessly test in search of truth, and as what
we decide upon as the tentative ground of facts we use to accept or reject those
theories. Popper wrote, ‘‘It should be noticed that the conjunction of two basic
statements, p and r which do not contradict each other, is in turn a basic statement’’
(Popper 2002, p. 84).
The basic statements (evidence) of the systematist are character observations, or
primary homology statements (dePinna 1991). These observations of topographic
similarity provide the evidence (e) for systematic analysis. A common basic
statement used in molecular systematics is the conjunction of three statements such
as ‘‘Gene x is in Taxon y’’ and ‘‘Gene x
1 is in taxon z’’ and ‘‘Gene x in taxon y is
most similar to gene x
1 in taxon Z out of all genes that we have sequences for.’’ The
falsifying hypothesis that this statement corroborates might be ‘‘Gene x from taxon
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1 from taxon z’’, (the
ideographic character of Grant and Kluge (2004)) or ‘‘gene x/x
1 is a synapomorphy
that is consistent with the hypothesis that taxon y is most closely related by common
descent to taxon x out of all of the taxa we have on hand.’’ These are singular
hypotheses of the existence of homology that can be consistent with, or contradict
other hypotheses of homology made by different characters about the evolutionary
history of the same taxa and, therefore also can contradict assertions of evolutionary
history made by a phylogeny in the process of reciprocal illumination (Hennig
1966). Each statement of similarity, or likeness, is independent and satisﬁes the
conditions of a basic statement in that (using Popper’s terms), (1) A primary
homology statement of similarity is not derivable from the universal and related
higher subclass, the phylogenetic tree or the natural law of descent with
modiﬁcation (2) On the other hand, a statement of similarity can corroborate a
homology hypothesis that itself contradicts the more universal statement that is a
phylogenetic tree. This is so because a tree hypothesis predicts the relationships that
should exist in any particular subset of the relationships implied in the tree.
Therefore, a tree can predict the negation of a homology hypothesis. On suboptimal
trees, we accept the falsiﬁcation provided by the homology hypotheses. On optimal
trees, we call this contradiction homoplasy, and those basic homology statements
that ‘‘cause’’ this contradiction offer alternate hypotheses about the evolutionary
history of the gene and or taxa-range in question (Farris 1983). A ﬁnite class of the
entire possible class of basic homology hypotheses will be permitted, or consistent
with any particular representation of the relationships of the taxa (tree). Those data
that can be arranged into a totally self-consistent arrangement may be said to be part
of one complex compound basic statement the relative weight of which may be
determined by the number of observations, or events it represents. In this sense,
constructing the weightiest basic homology statement is the goal of the total
evidence strategy of Kluge (1998) and Kluge and Wolf (1993), (Lienau 2007).
Evidence (e) in a Popperian framework is observation; transformation series of
characters in phylogenetic systematics are hypotheses of homology. Hypotheses (h)
are not evidence. From the grandest, most character and taxon rich tree of life
hypothesis to the least inclusive potentially falsifying hypothesis of character state
transformation, hypotheses are conjectures that are not agreed upon by convention,
but must be corroborated, at some level, by an observation that is agreed upon by
convention. In other words, hypotheses are not evidence of themselves. In
phylogenetic analysis, hypotheses can only be challenged by other hypotheses; we
take as given that these hypotheses are corroborated by evidence that is observed
and agreed upon as a basic statement of fact sensu (Popper 2002). This evidentiary
observation is the primary homology statement sensu (dePinna 1991). As Grant and
Kluge (2004) put it, ‘‘[w]hat is actually observed are the parts of an individual
organism, yet those parts can be individuated according to a variety of criteria, each
of which may be relevant to a given problem or in a particular inferential context.’’
It is the individuation of the parts in a manner speciﬁc to the evolutionary context
that is the basic, ‘‘primary’’ statement of homology. This statement is always based,
at its root, on an observation of similarity. The criteria we use to accept two or more
physical entities (such as genes) as the same can and should vary with the demands
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choose different similarity criteria to group genes together as gene families for a tree
of life study then for an analysis of a genus of bats.
Further, evidence from the same data source can be examined from different
vantage points, thus increasing the precision of the description of taxa. This
approach can be thought of as analogous to using a biscopic camera to produce a
three-dimensional image of a subject, instead of using only one aperture to produce
a two dimensional image. Several systematic techniques have been designed that
use this strategy; one approach was discussed in the context of nucleic acid—amino
acid sequences by Agosti et al. (1996). In that study, the authors concluded that
combination of information from the two vantage points of the same source of data
actually increased information content and hence had the ability to increase DOC.
Speciﬁcally, they suggested that the use of both nucleic acid and amino acid
sequences helped to establish a character weighting approach without resorting to
a priori notions of character quality, but read (Simmons et al. 2002) for an
alternative view. In a similar vein, Fitch and Smith (1983), Gatesy et al. (1993), and
Wheeler et al. (1995) discussed alignment problems, pointing out to solutions when
dealing with the ‘alignment space’. In the context of alignment space, different cost
values for gaps and changes in alignments can produce different vantage points of
test. Comparison of alignments from different cost combinations can produce
columns in the alignments that are identical, while other columns may vary from
alignment to alignment. The aforementioned authors designated the columns that
are identical in all alignments as ‘alignment unambiguous’ and those that are
different or have no match across alignments as ‘alignment ambiguous’.
Gatesy et al. (1993) and Wheeler et al. (1995) indicated two ways of dealing with
the alignment ambiguous columns. The ﬁrst, named ‘culling’, simply removes any
alignment ambiguous column. While always yielding more consistent results, the
culling procedure also removes potential tests from the analysis. They also suggested
an approach called ‘elision’, a procedure that concatenates alignments from different
costregimes.Theypointedoutthatthosecolumnsthatarealignmentunambiguousget
higher weight than columns deemed alignment ambiguous, due to the more frequent
occurrence of the former type of columns from alignment to alignment. Wheeler
(1995) also introduced a ‘sensitivity analysis approach’ to the alignment space
problem. This approach generates values estimated for percentage of shared and
congruent groups (PSG and PCG, respectively) for a wide range of alignment cost
regimesandchoosesasolutionbasedonoptimizedvaluesforthesemetricswithawell
corroborated phylogeny. Wheeler (1995) also utilized the ‘incongruence length
difference’metric(ILD,MickevichandFarris1981)inthesesensitivityanalyses,asa
measure of congruence. All of these approaches to the alignment space, though, have
in common the problem of arbitrariness in the gap cost regime.
6 Content, Consistency and Degree of Corroboration in ToL Analyses
In accordance with Lienau et al. (2006) and Lienau (2007), we suggest that when
choosing among different vantage points of observation in phylogenetic analysis,
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corroborated homology hypotheses. For example, in whole genome ToL studies,
statements of gene presence or absence corroborate potentially falsifying hypoth-
eses, or ideographic characters of transformation sensu (Grant and Kluge 2004), of
gene gain (through duplication or HGT) and loss during genomic evolution that can
be tested by their agreement with the overall phylogenetic patterns suggested by all
gene gain and loss statements in the analysis, using measurements such as the
consistency index (CI; Kluge and Farris 1969). However, it is important to note that
corroboration of a hypothesis under a Popperian framework is determined not only
by consistency (i.e., the extent to which the data do not disagree) but also by
information content (i.e., the strength and speciﬁcity of the predictions made by the
hypothesis). The extent to which phylogenetic hypothesis is refutable is determined
by the boldness of the hypothesis, or resolution of the tree, and the amount of
relevant information available to test it. New metrics that incorporate these two
concepts, like the one developed by Lienau et al. (2006), may aide us in our ability
to determine the DOC (as opposed to degree of consistency) of a particular ToL
hypothesis.
If, during the process of inference of the ToL from the MoL, the criterion to
which primary importance is ascribed to is DOC; its increase would be best
achieved by adding characters and taxa; in general terms, those studies with more
characters (e.g., whole genome studies) will have a higher DOC than those with
fewer characters (e.g., single gene phylogenies) provided both contain the same
number of taxa. On the other hand, only content is increased by adding taxa,
because using more taxa in an analysis increases the universality, or the breadth of
‘reality’ that is explained by the hypothesis, but not the number of tests levied on
that hypothesis. In this context, only content and therefore potential testability (as
opposed to DOC) would be increased. Because potential DOC depends both on the
content and on the amount of evidence used to test that content, any total evidence,
whole genome (many characters, or vantage points) ToL (many taxa) study would
have high potential DOC both because of the large number of characters, which
would bring a multitude of critical tests to bear on competing phylogenetic
hypotheses, and the large breadth of taxa, which would increase content and
therefore testability.
Supertree ToL studies (i.e., those that use many sources of topological
information, but lack information about character transformation series that span
the entire range of taxa in question) have high content because they almost always
use a wide breadth of taxonomic sampling. However, supertree approaches, despite
Faith and Trueman (2001) arguments to the contrary, do not increase potential
DOC, but rather a single component of potential DOC—namely, content. In order to
truly increase the DOC of ToL analyses, phylogenetic systematists should use the
maximum amount of character information possible as evidence to test the high
content implicit in the hypotheses of species relationship that include many, many
taxa.
On the basis of these arguments, we conclude that before we worry about the
ToL, we must worry even more about the MoL. That is, we should take great care in
just how we collect and assemble our evidence before we use it to test hypotheses of
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123evolutionary history. Focusing on the construction of the Tree of Life before we
determine the philosophical desiderata of constructing the Matrix of Life, as in
supertree analyses, is truly putting the cart (that is, the ToL) before the horse (i.e.,
the MoL).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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